

DECLINE OF CIVILIAN POWER IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

TAKAO SEBATA

Abstract

Over the last thirty years, military officials of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have begun voicing their opinions more aggressively, exerting influence and power in such areas as: the right of personnel management, budget formulation, organization, and defense policy decision-making. Due to the enhanced status of military officials, change of power balance between civilians and the military is taking place. This paper examines civil-military relations in the above areas and discusses how this change will affect Japan's defense policy in the future.

Introduction

A shift in the balance of power between civilians and the military is taking place in Japanese politics, which has profound implications for Japan's foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

During the 1990s, the rise of military officials of the SDF became evident in the following events: Japan's response to the Gulf War of 1990-91, the SDF's participation in the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO), the dispatch of the Maritime SDF to the Indian Ocean in 2001, and the dispatch of the Ground SDF to Iraq in 2004. The influence of military officials increased as closer military cooperation between the SDF and United States forces further accelerated under the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and the 1997 Guidelines for the United States-Japan Defense Cooperation (hereafter referred to as the Guidelines). The Guidelines clarified roles and missions of the SDF and defined its cooperation with United States forces. The Guidelines also enhanced the position of the military in Japan's defense policy decision-making and has provided military officials with the opportunity to increase their voices in policy planning and budget formulation. In other words, external factors such as the Guidelines, along with development of military technology, have expanded roles and missions and increased influence and power of the military. The alliance relations through defense cooperation under the Guidelines have strengthened military officials.

Politicians and the Ministry of Finance can still control the SDF mainly through budget making which affects equipment purchases and personnel, yet they experience difficulty in checking the SDF's military cooperation with United States forces under the Guidelines. Although military operations and cooperation are both still under the overall supervision of civilian officials in the internal bureaus of the Defense Agency, the influence of those civilian officials declined in the

following areas: the right of personnel management, budget formulation, organization, and defense policy decision-making. As a result, the military began to demand for equal status with civilians, which might further lead to the decline of civilians with power and influence. Power balance shifting toward the military will cause a change in Japan's foreign policy, which will affect East Asian security. China and both Koreas will oppose Japan using the SDF as a means of foreign policy. Such a policy eventually will create a Japan that can say "No" to the United States and might lead to an independent Japan asking abrogation of the Security Treaty.

Therefore, it is important to examine changing power balance between the military and civilians over the last thirty years. First, this paper examines the status of the military and structure of decision-making. Then, it looks into the rise of the military regarding budget formulation. The paper also analyzes the military's influence in the right of personnel management and organization. Finally, this paper examines defense policy decision-making in the NDPO and the Guidelines.

Status of the Military in Postwar Japan

The relationship between civilian and military officials has been always a controversial issue in postwar Japan. In prewar Japan, the military had enormous influence in decision-making and overshadowed the civilian leaders. The Ministries of the Army and Navy were the most powerful ministries along with the Ministry of the Internal Affairs before 1945. By contrast, the Defense Agency does not hold a powerful position in the Japanese bureaucracy. It is not even an independent full ministry, but is placed under the Prime Minister's Office, which puts the military under the direct and indirect civilian supervision. Military's power in decision-making has been denied up until now.

As a result of the lessons learned from World War II, the Japanese Government is determined that civilians will control the military. Therefore, the status of military officials in postwar Japan is intentionally lower than that of civilians. Japan is probably one of the few countries in the world that does not lend much credence to professional military opinions with regard to defense and security issues. Military officials are not respected in Japan. In this sense, Japan has "subjective civilian control."¹

Moreover, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and International Trade and Industry (now Economy, Trade, and Industry) as well as National Police Agency have placed their officials in important positions within the Defense Agency so that they could reflect their "economic and political perspectives...in the formulation and implementation of the defense policy."²

Civilian and Military Officials in the Structure of Decision-Making

Both civilian and military personnel play an important role in the decision-making of defense policy. The commander-in-chief of the SDF is the Prime Minister. Under him, the director general of the Defense Agency is second in command. One deputy director general, two political affairs officers, one administrative vice-minister, and ten councillors, who are all civilians, support the director general. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom has these powerful

civilians since the military are absolutely under the influence of them in the case of Japan. This is unique civil supremacy in Japan. The administrative vice-minister is the highest bureaucrat in the Defense Agency and supports the director general both in *military* and in non-military affairs. The chairman of the Joint Staff Council (JSC-The JSC comprises of a chairman and three chiefs of staff of the Ground, the Maritime, and the Air), who is not equal to the administrative vice-minister, does not directly advise the Prime Minister, but works through the administrative vice-minister to communicate to the director general. Until 2006, the chairman of the JSC was equal to three chiefs of staff and did not have the authority to give orders to the service chiefs. In the United States, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) can directly advise the President and is an informal member of the National Security Council, whereas in Japan, his counterpart is not a member of the Security Council.³ This is the major difference between the Japanese and American systems as well as prewar and postwar Japan.

Since 1954, when the SDF was created, civilian officials within the internal bureaus have been given greater authority than the military, especially in terms of providing advice to the director general. For example, the chief secretary and each bureau chief assist the director general in formulating his directives and give approval to each chief of staff concerning general policy as well as preparation of a basic annual operational plan for each service (i.e. the Ground, the Maritime, and the Air). Civilian officials also assist the director general with respect to matters under the jurisdiction of the JSC and in his general supervision of each service. The chairman of the JSC is given authority to assist the director general concerning the basis and integral adjustment of directives and orders given to the SDF in times of emergency. But, until recently the chairman had only authority to preside over the SDF.

There are four internal bureaus apart from the Secretariat to the director general. Basic matters are decided through consultation among councillors. Among them, the Defense Policy Bureau director plays an important role. While each bureau director (who is also a councillor) has equal authority within the agency, the director of the Defense Policy Bureau is the most influential and in charge of Japan's defense policy and defense budget.⁴

In general, officials from the Finance Ministry devoted themselves to the task of increasing the defense budget while they left the decisions on important defense policies to military officials. These officials in the internal bureaus made use of United States pressure against the Finance Ministry to increase the defense budget rather than exert pressure directly on the Finance Ministry. The above tactics of leaving important decisions to military officials seems to have caused a decline in civilians' influence and brought about the corresponding rise in the power of military officials. As military technology rapidly progressed in the 1990s, some officials in the internal bureaus began to rely on military officials' expertise in budget compilation and negotiations with the Finance Ministry and to follow the hawkish ideas promoted by military officials. Since those officials in the internal bureaus sent from the Ministry of Finance do not have military expertise, they tend to rely on the opinions of military officials. As a result, civilians' input in the decision-making process has been greatly reduced.

Dissatisfaction and Distrust of Military Officials toward Politicians and Civilians

Military officials regard their own status in the government as extraordinarily low. In the past, civilian officials doubted military officials' viewpoints on military issues and put military officials under their control. As a result, discord existed between them.

The former Chairman of the JSC Hiroomi Kurisu complains that it was the internal bureaus, not the chairman of the JSC, who reported to the director general concerning the judgment on the state of military affairs. He also states that the internal bureaus opposed the increase of the JSC's power and asserts that the internal bureaus believed that everything was under their jurisdiction.⁵

The former Chairman of the JSC Tsugio Yata points out the Japanese characteristic of civilian control. He states that in the past, officials in the internal bureaus thought that civilian control meant the internal bureaus' dominance over military officials rather than primacy in politics over the military. Yata explains three basic differences between civilian and military officials, the first being a difference between political soundness and military rationality. Civilians thought about Japan's defense policy from the viewpoint of political considerations while the military sought the best military means to defend Japan. Civilians and the military also differed in their perception of threat. Civilians thought that there was little threat to Japan while the military perceived that there was a potential threat, which might become a real threat. The third difference was that civilians felt that the Security Treaty had been functioning effectively, whereas the military believed that it had not.⁶

Since the 1980s, however, the relationship between civilian and military officials has been less antagonistic than before. According to some officials in the SDF, both civilians and the military are able to talk freely, share their views, cooperate with each other, and negotiate as a team with the Finance Ministry. Civilian officials in the 1980s began to study hard and to skillfully combine military rationality with political consideration.⁷ Therefore, civilian officials prepared the documents dealing with replies to interpellation in the Diet in the 1980s, whereas military officials had prepared these documents in the 1960s and 1970s. However, because of the rapid development of military technology, civilian officials since the 1980s once again have come to rely on military officials during the budget compilation process and interpellation in the Diet.

The Budget Compilation

Since the 1980s, once the defense budget was compiled and submitted to the Finance Ministry, civilians in the internal bureaus have become keen advocates of the SDF. Before the 1980s, civilians tended to supervise the military. Nowadays, however, some officials within the internal bureaus even echoed the hawkish line of the military. The era, when civilians who held down the defense budget were doves and the military who advocated its increase were hawks, came to an end.

Osamu Kaihara, former secretary general of the National Defense Council and former cabinet secretary of the Defense Agency, criticizes the internal bureaus as follows:

Within the Defense Agency, a draft prepared by a couple of military staff becomes a plan of

the agency. The internal bureaus, as "civilians" whose role is to control "the military," lack the ability to direct each staff office of the "Ground," the "Maritime," and the "Air." At most, the internal bureaus modify words of the draft and stamp their seals mechanically without reading the contents.⁸

Unlike military officials, the internal bureaus are partially comprised of officials from other ministries and agencies. Some of them return to their home offices after a couple of years. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for civilians to effectively command the military.

In fact, in 1979 former Administrative Vice-Minister of the Defense Agency Ko Maruyama explains the relations between civilian and military officials:

A functional brake is civilian control. But, this control is not well established yet. Officials in the internal bureaus need to study harder so that they will be able to understand the defense budget regarding technical issues such as defense maintenance. Today, a draft of the defense budget is prepared in each staff office of the SDF, and it is sent to the Ministry of Finance after the revision by the bureaus of Defense Policy and Budget of the Defense Agency.... In the Ministry of Finance,...due to lack of knowledge on the side of the internal bureaus,...military officials of staff offices explain the drafts to Budget Bureau officials of the Ministry of Finance....As a result, the internal bureaus are useless concerning budget compilation, and staff offices depend on the Budget Bureau rather than on the internal bureaus to make the budget.⁹

It may be argued that the role of the internal bureaus until the late 1970s was primarily to cut the defense budget submitted by each service of the SDF. The two situations mentioned above existed before the 1980s.

Even since the 1980s, however, these basic situations have not changed. Keiichi Ito, former secretary general of the National Defense Council and former director of the Defense Policy Bureau of the Defense Agency, admits that military officials, who gained confidence regarding security and defense issues, increased their influence. He also states that civilian officials had difficulty keeping up with the development of military technology.¹⁰

In fact, the military have greatly increased its influence because military technology has become more sophisticated and specialized since the late 1980s and because military officials' expertise is necessary in order to explain the defense budget to the Finance Ministry. During the defense budget making process, military officials can persuade Budget Bureau officials to increase the weapons procurement budget since military officials can explain the role and importance of the particular weapons in defense policy. As a result, civilian officials became less important than military officials in the budget making process. Therefore, officials of the Budget Bureau began to speak highly of military officials and to listen to them rather than to civilian officials. In this way, influence and power of military officials was further enhanced in the late 1980s and 1990s thanks to their knowledge of advanced military technology and specialization in composition of combat troops of the SDF.

The Right of Personnel Management and the Organization

According to Katsuro Kawabe, the rise of the military has become salient in three areas since the late 1980s. Civilians in the internal bureaus have difficulty controlling personnel matters specific to the military. In the past, the internal bureaus checked any promotion above the rank of colonel, but since the late 1980s personnel matters became an exclusive right of the military. Furthermore, the military in many cases conducted briefings on important issues directly to the Prime Minister. This trend has become noticeable since the Hashimoto Administration in 1996. Finally, the military began to disregard the internal bureaus by intentionally not reporting important matters to civilians or by allowing lower-ranking officers (officers whose rank is twice lower than the rank in the past) to brief the internal bureaus. Kawabe points out the weakened influence of the internal bureaus, saying that military officials run the entire procurement process of major equipment due to the rapid development of military technology. Another example of the weakened influence of the internal bureaus, according to Kawabe, is that the Defense Agency was not consulted when the Japanese Government discussed the revised laws related to the 1997 Guidelines, including important changes such as the definition of "the areas surrounding Japan."¹¹

In 1981, military officials tried in vain to increase the authority of the JSC chairman so that basic directives and orders from the director general would be given to the SDF through the chairman in times of emergency. The intention of military officials was to limit the role of the internal bureaus to military administrative matters and to monopolize issues concerning operations and directives so that military officials would be able to directly advise the director general and the Prime Minister.¹²

Another example of the declined power of civilians is the recent movement on the military's side demanding equal status to that of civilians. The military proposed in June 2004 the elimination of the post of councilors in the internal bureaus. Upon the proposal made by the chief of staff of the Maritime SDF, the director general instructed to the key officials of the agency the review of the system of councilors. The military also demanded the transfer of supervisory authority over the SDF that administrative vice-minister has, to the chief of the Joint Staff (this post was created in 2006). In this way, the military requested that the chief of the Joint Staff be equal to administrative vice-minister in supporting the Prime Minister. Some military officials even argue for the elimination of internal bureaus including the administrative vice-minister. In other words, the military want to establish a system that directly advises the Prime Minister without being controlled by the internal bureaus.¹³

Demand for the elimination of the post of councilors is a significant attempt given the fact that civilians completely controlled the military until the 1970s. Now, the military are strong enough to let the director general review the councilors' system, which is one of the pillars of Japan's unique civil supremacy. Japan did not have a tradition of civilian control and the opposition parties in the Diet are still weak in checking government policies. Therefore, the movement mentioned above is a clear challenge to civilians. The elimination of the councilors' system, if realized, might lead to further decline of civilians' power and influence.

The 1976, 1995, and 2004 NDPO

While military officials have not become a dominant force in the defense policy decision-making to the extent that they could decide on the defense policy on their own, the rise of the military has led to the decline of civilians since the 1980s in this area as well.

In the 1970s, Takuya Kubo played an important role, as director of the Defense Policy Bureau and administrative vice-minister, in formulating the defense policy plans including the NDPO. There was no one in the Defense Agency who had better knowledge than Kubo on defense issues. His presence in the agency was so intimidating that almost no one would dare challenge him. According to Kurisu, Director General of the Defense Agency Michita Sakata told him that military officials seldom talked in meetings with civilian officials of the internal bureaus. And whenever they did talk, Kubo immediately intervened. Therefore, Sakata asked each of military officials to express their opinions more aggressively. The above remarks show that civilian officials led by Kubo had clear supremacy over military officials in the 1970s. Civilian officials overwhelmed military officials at that time and took the leadership in deciding on the NDPO in 1976.¹⁴

In the case of the decision-making of the 1995 NDPO, however, military officials worked together with civilians from the beginning throughout the review process of the 1976 NDPO. For example, military officials were able to incorporate into the 1995 NDPO the phrase that "Japan would adequately cope with the situation which would greatly affect Japan's peace and security in her surrounding area by trying to carry out smooth and effective application of the United States-Japan Security Treaty System." Tetsuya Nishimoto, chairman of the JSC, happily states that the SDF could expand its task thanks to this phrase.¹⁵ The SDF established a clear mandate to adopt possible countermeasures in the event of an emergency in the areas surrounding Japan. In this respect, military officials were able to not only defend their own interests, but also expand the roles and missions of the SDF in response to an emergency in the areas surrounding Japan.

The 1995 NDPO was also a result of an interaction of officials in both the United States and Japan. In particular, military officials of both countries played an important role. Both United States and Japanese officials worked together, and as a result, the United States Government spoke highly of the 1995 NDPO. Naoaki Murata, administrative vice-minister of the Defense Agency, in February 1996 stated that the 1995 NDPO received high praise among United States defense officials. United States approval is indicative of the increased power of officials of the Defense Agency and the SDF, because it indicated that officials of the United States Defense Department and United States military welcomed Japanese counterparts as equal partners in planning new policies.¹⁶

The 1995 NDPO was revised in 2004. During the decision-making process of the 2004 NDPO, the Finance Ministry tried to cut the defense budget and reduce manpower and equipment of the SDF as it tried in the past. However, three services of the SDF disagreed to and strongly resisted the Finance Ministry plan regarding the size and degree in reduction of the defense budget, equipment, and manpower. The Finance Ministry proposed huge reduction in the SDF including reduction of 40,000 Ground SDF personnel. After long negotiations with Finance Ministry officials, military officials finally agreed to carry out quantitative reduction of

equipment, but the three services were able to maintain quality of defense capability, and reduction of the Ground SDF was limited to only 5,000 personnel.¹⁷

If one compares military officials' influence in decision-making in the 1970s with their influence in the 1990s, it is obvious that military officials increased their influence and status in the Defense Agency. Now, military officials work together with civilian officials in policy planning and try to establish "objective civilian control" in decision-making.

The 1978 and 1997 Guidelines

In formulating the 1997 Guidelines as well, military officials played an especially important role because they had knowledge of military technology and had close contact with United States military officials.

As former Commanding General of the Western Army of the Ground SDF Eiichi Muramatsu states, the roles and activities of military officials have increased. Contact between United States military officials and both military and civilian officials of the SDF and the Defense Agency have increased.¹⁸ In other words, one can argue that because of the continued development of the SDF, the level of the SDF in training and fighting capability by the late 1990s became substantial enough to carry out military cooperation with United States forces under the 1997 Guidelines. Therefore, the military became confident in their roles and missions and began to speak their opinions more aggressively in decision-making with strong pride.

According to Toshiyuki Shikata, there were two reasons why the United States and Japan formulated the 1997 Guidelines. One of them was "civilian control." In order to prevent military officials of the SDF and United States forces from promoting operational cooperation with only the military rationality, it was necessary to set up political and diplomatic guidelines so that the military would not go too far. Another reason was that, in the past, most of the security cooperation had been carried out in the area of political and diplomatic adjustments and there was little progress in practical cooperation between the SDF and United States forces in Japan. Therefore, in order to rectify this situation, the review of the 1978 Guidelines began in 1996. Shikata also argues that the Defense Agency has sent many young civilian officials and key officers of the SDF to the United States to let them study defense policy decision-making and military strategy. These well-educated, well-trained officials have become negotiators who played an important role in revising the 1978 Guidelines within each working team. Some of them have studied at the same research institute or the same university in the United States. As a result, the psychological barrier that had existed among the officials of the Defense Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the SDF has almost disappeared.¹⁹

Yoichi Funabashi noticed the change of the influence between military and civilian officials in the review of the 1978 Guidelines. The work of the 1978 Guidelines was carried out under the guidance of civilian officials with a minor role of the military. However, military officials participated in the work of the 1997 Guidelines from the beginning, and civilian and military officials worked together. Whereas the officials of the Foreign Ministry mainly negotiated and formulated the Guidelines of 1978, military officials led negotiations and drafted the 1997 Guidelines.²⁰

In this way, today, civilian officials in the internal bureaus recognized the status of military

officials, and strong distrust among the military toward civilians is almost gone. In this respect, Japan is heading toward "objective civilian control." These changes mentioned above clearly show that under the 1978 Guidelines review process, the military increased influence and power against civilians because the Guidelines required professional military knowledge.

Implications of Empowering the SDF Military

Through the process of formulating the Guidelines and the NDPO, the role of the United States also increased in Japan's defense policy making. In other words, Japan's defense policy decision-making became bilateral. The increased United States role also led to enhanced status of the military of the SDF in policy formation, which has profound implications in Japan's security policy. Now the military has a much stronger voice in decision-making than in the 1970s. Military officials will become more assertive in bilateral relations, which might demand a more independent approach including domestic development of military technology such as FSX (Fighter Support Experimental).

In fact, there was a fear that the more Japan expanded her roles and missions, the less Japan became dependent on the United States. Such a Japan might even challenge the United States national interests. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. expresses his concern about United States-Japan relations, pointing out that "the absence of a broader institutional framework" might lead to a re-armed Japan, one with a "normal' great power status" that "will act unilaterally in ways contrary to American interests."²¹ Mike Mochizuki also explains the difficult position of the Pentagon, saying that there was "sharp disagreement" among officials "whether to urge Japan to take on new defense missions even in cooperation with the United States."²²

In fact, Haruo Fujii argues that there was a voice among SDF military officials that Japan had no choice but to support the United States for the time being, but some day Japan would become an influential player in international politics. He also states that the United States had opposed any attempt of Japan trying to acquire an autonomous defense capability, such as the development of FSX and the possession of a light aircraft carrier. He wonders how long military officials of the SDF would be obedient to a United States that has tried to keep the SDF under her control.²³

Many United States policy makers might not realize the implications that empowering the military of the SDF through bilateral defense cooperation such as the Guidelines might someday come back to the United States as a boomerang or blowback. Such a policy might bring about an independent Japan. Therefore, giving power and influence to the SDF military might not be a wise policy for the United States. While many Americans do not trust Japan's democratic mechanism to check the military, it seems that United States policy makers think that as long as Japan remains under the Security Treaty, they can manage Japan's military power.²⁴ Therefore, the United States continues to encourage the SDF to increase fighting capability and expand roles and missions under the Guidelines.

When the military try to enhance their influence in a democracy, one can see a bureaucratic power struggle between civilians and the military because the military is forced to act within the legal framework. Even though one can see enlarged influence and power of the SDF, if Japan has

an effective political system, civilian control will work. Therefore, it is important to maintain unique civilian control such as councilors' system and Article 9 in the case of Japan.

Counter-Arguments

One can argue that while the military's influence remained constant, Japan's threat environment changed after the Cold War ended. Therefore, Japan began to take more assertive approach toward her foreign policy using the SDF more actively. Or, civilians including the Prime Minister became more confident about Japan's status in the world and became more hawkish in defense and foreign policy.

However, Japan's threat environment has not changed. On the contrary, it improved since the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, which was regarded as Japan's potential enemy, is gone and democratic Russia is not a threat to Japan. Russia needs Japan's capital and technology. China also needs Japan's capital and technology. China and Japan are now the largest trading partners. China's nuclear threat to Japan, if any, remained the same since 1964, and recent rapid military modernization of China does not pose a threat to Japan because it is aimed at Taiwan and the United States. While North Korea improves her missile and nuclear capabilities, they are not directly against Japan. North Korean military threat, if any, has not changed for a long time since she maintains potential capability to attack Japan with rockets and guerrilla commandos.

It is true that civilians, politicians, and the public became more conservative, hawkish, and confident about defense and security issues than before and as a result, became tolerant toward the SDF. It is true that Prime Minister Koizumi is the most hawkish politician since Yasuhiro Nakasone. However, overseas dispatches of the SDF in 1991, 2001, and 2004 are mainly a result of United States pressure. In other words, Japan carried out these dispatches in order to maintain good relations with the United States, not as a direct result of civilians becoming hawkish or the military gaining power. For example, civilians' hawkish attitude and military's enhanced influence indirectly affected the decision to dispatch the Ground SDF to Iraq in 2004 as Koizumi's quick decision showed. But, the military have not gained power strong enough to be able to decide on the SDF's overseas dispatch on their own.

Attitude toward the SDF among civilians, politicians, and the public changed, and a barrier lowered to use the SDF in Japan's foreign policy. The military basically have no objection to these dispatches because these events were excellent opportunities for military officials to prove their *raison d'être* and to enhance their roles and missions. As a result of these dispatches, influence and status of the military enhanced.

Conclusion

Expanded roles and missions of the SDF and increasing power of the military are not equivalent to the resurgence of militarism in Japan, which is a return to the situation in the 1930s, but a challenge to civilians. Japan is a democracy with civilian control, and Article 9 does not allow resurgence of militarism. Rather, military officials try to be equal to civilian officials. Therefore, recent change mentioned above and its implications are not clear to many democratic countries.

Military officials are not empowered to make defense policy by themselves, but increased their influence due to expanded roles and missions such as overseas dispatch and defense cooperation with United States troops as well as specialized knowledge on military technology. The military are not dictating to civilians, but they are increasing their voices, influence, and power. In other words, they became proud and more confident of their mission and ask for "objective civilian control."

Civilians since the 1990s also came to share views with the military. A more hawkish attitude toward defense and security issues among civilians is a result of United States pressure and their hope to avoid the United States criticism and to keep good relations with the United States. Under such a context, it is natural for military officials to play a major role in the defense policy decision-making. And this situation accelerated in promoting the status of the military and led to the increased voice of the military. As a result, the SDF became an important player in defense policy decision-making.

To the eyes of many democratic countries, the move mentioned above by the military is natural because the military are simply asking equal access to the Prime Minister in military advice. In most democratic countries, the military can directly advise the Prime Minister or the President on military matters. Therefore, increasing influence and power of the military is natural, showing that Japan is becoming a "normal state." But, Japan is different in the sense that everything including military matters must go through administrative vice-minister.

The question is whether Japan should become a "normal state" in civil-military relations and use the SDF to promote Japan's national interests. If Japan becomes a "normal state," she might jeopardize East Asian security, and the United States might have difficulty controlling such a Japan.

Notes

¹ Samuel Huntington emphasizes military officers' professionalism and civilian control (objective and subjective). Before modern military officers' corps was formed, civilian control was maintained by maximizing civilian power, which Huntington called "subjective civilian control." But, in modern times, civilian control was maintained by maximizing professionalism, which he called "objective civilian control." If the military are professional enough, they will remain neutral and not intervene in politics. Civilians must respect the military's professional expertise and independence and accept the military both socially and politically. In other words, civilians and the military have to establish coexistence relations. This is called "objective civilian control."

"Subjective civilian control," on the other hand, does not admit independence of the military and demands that the military absolutely follow civilians. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957); and Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil-Military Relations," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol.2, ed., David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 487-495.

² Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Japan's National Security* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.21. The Defense Agency reserved a minimum of four out of eleven

top posts for such officials in the past: bureau directors for Equipment (who comes from MITI) and Finance (who comes from the Finance Ministry) and councillors in charge of health and international affairs. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47. Currently, officials who are originally from the Defense Agency have gradually moved into top positions.

³ The National Defense Council was replaced by the Security Council in 1986. Within the Security Council, the Security Office was created as a secretariat in 1986 and is responsible for reviewing the important defense policies submitted by the Defense Agency and provides a place of inter-ministerial coordination on all security issues. Eleven councillors temporarily assigned from various ministries and agencies consist of a core group within the Security Office. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

⁴ In 2001, the Defense Agency converted the Bureaus of Finance and Equipment into the Bureau of Administration. Now, the internal bureaus consist of four bureaus (Bureaus of Defense Policy, Operation, Personnel Management and Education, and Administration) and Director's Secretariat. Boeicho, ed., *Defense of Japan 2002* (Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2002), p.243. As of 1999, the internal bureaus had about 600 civilian officials consisting of only 0.2 percent of the Defense Agency personnel, but they pride themselves on shoring up Japan's defense policy. *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 29 March 1999.

⁵ Hiroomi Kurisu, *Watashi no Boeiron* [My defense argument] (Tokyo: Takagi Shobo, 1978), pp. 165-166; and former Chairman Hiroomi Kurisu of the Joint Staff Council, interview by author, 25 May 1987.

⁶ Hidenori Itagaki, *Yata Tsugio no Nihon Boei no Kozu* [Japan's defense composed by Tsugio Yata] (Tokyo: Kosaido Shuppan, 1986), pp. 149-158; and former Chairman Tsugio Yata of the Joint Staff Council, interview by author, 22 April 1987.

⁷ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 24 July 1982. Almost all civilian and military officials with whom the author met in the Defense Agency in 1987 agree that their relationship was better than in the past.

⁸ Osamu Kaihara, *Machigaidarake no Boeiron* [The defense argument full of mistakes] (Tokyo: Guriin Aroosha, 1983), p.193.

⁹ Ko Maruyama, "Nichibei Anpo wa Karrapo de aru," [The United States-Japan Security Treaty has no substance] interview, *Shokun* (Gentlemen) (October 1979): 27-28.

¹⁰ Former Secretary General Keiichi Ito of the National Defense Council, interview by author, 7 April 1987. In fact, in January 1997, the Information Headquarters was formed within the Defense Agency. For the first time, civilian officials of the internal bureaus work under a general of the SDF who is the director of the Information Headquarters, and military and civilian officials work side by side. Civilian officials such as Seiki Nishihiro and Shin Hatakeyama thought that the Information Headquarters would be placed under the leadership of a civilian official, but military officials of the SDF strongly objected to such an idea. As a result, a compromise was reached between the internal bureaus and the military. Yoichi Funabashi, *Domei Hyoryu* [The alliance that is straying] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), pp. 125-127. This is another example of military officials increasing influence.

¹¹ Katsuro Kawabe, "Naze Jieitai 'Seifukugumi' wa Taito shita no ka," [Why did "military officials" of the SDF gain power?] *Chuo Koron* (Central Public Opinion) (July 2000): 140-142.

- ¹² *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 16 October 1981.
- ¹³ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 27 August 2004; Tetsuo Maeda, Shigeru Handa, and Akira Kawasaki, "Zadankai-Anzenhosho Seisaku no Daitenkan ga Hajimatta," [A round-table talk: A large turnout of the security policy started] *Sekai* (The World) (December 2004): 86-90; and Atsushi Kouketsu, "Bunmintousei no Konnichiteki Kadai," [Current task in civilian control] *Sekai* (The World) (December 2004): 93-96.
- ¹⁴ Kurisu's statement was confirmed by Sakata. Kurisu, interview by author; and former Director General Michita Sakata of the Defense Agency, interview by author, 2 May 1987.
- ¹⁵ *Mainich Shimbun* (Daily News), 9 August 1996.
- ¹⁶ Shigenobu Tamura, *Nichibei Anpo to Kyokuto Yuji* [The United States-Japan Security Treaty and emergency in the Far East] (Tokyo: Nansosha, 1997), p.75.
- ¹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 28 April; 22 October; 8 November; 11 December 2004; and Boeicho, ed., *Defense of Japan 2005* (Tokyo: Gyosei, 2005), pp. 83-106.
- ¹⁸ Former Commanding General Eiichi Muramatsu of the Western Army, the Ground Self-Defense Forces, interview by author, 11 May 1987.
- ¹⁹ Toshiyuki Shikata, "Nichibei Boei Kyoryoku no tame no Shishin (Gaidorain) Kaitei no Keii." [Process in the revision of the Guidelines for the United States-Japan Defense Cooperation] In Gaiko Seisaku Kettei Yoin Kenkyukai, ed., *Nihon no Gaiko Seisaku Kettei Yoin* [Factors in Japan's foreign policy decision-making] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1999), pp. 185, 207.
- ²⁰ Funabashi, *Domei Hyoryu*, p. 131; Yoichi Funabashi, "Nichibei Anpo Saiteigi no Zen Kaibo," [Total analysis on the redefinition of the United States-Japan Security Treaty] *Sekai* (The World) (May 1996): 47; and *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 9 June 1997.
- ²¹ Kenneth Dam, John Deutch, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David M. Rowe, "Harnessing Japan: A US Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1993): 38-39; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Coping with Japan," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter 1992/93): 113-14.
- ²² Mike M. Mochizuki, "A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance." In Mike M. Mochizuki, ed., *Toward a True Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 20.
- ²³ Haruo Fujii, *Nichibei Kyodo Sakusen no Tettei Kenkyu* [A thorough study on United States-Japan joint operations] (Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1992), pp. 74-76.
- ²⁴ The so-called "Cork in the Bottle" argument explains that United States forces in Japan are a cork in the bottle to prevent wine (Japan's military power projection or Japan's militarism) from coming out of the bottle. According to a public opinion poll conducted in March 1999, 49 percent of Americans who participated in the survey said that United States forces in Japan were there not to defend Japan, but to prevent the resurgence of Japan's militarism or military projection against the United States. Only 12 percent of those participated in the survey stated that United States forces were there to defend Japan. This view is shared by high ranking military officials of the United States. *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi News), 13 April 1999. In this way, even Japan's only ally, the United States, does not trust Japan (i.e., Japan's civilian control which lasts for sixty years).